Single Question: Whether it was necessary for man in this present state that some doctrine be supernaturally inspired.

1. The question Interpolation: “Desiring something etc. [quoting Peter Lombard ad loc.]. Concerning the prologue of the first book there are five questions. The first is about the necessity of this doctrine: whether it is necessary for man in this present state that there be some supernaturally inspired doctrine for him. The second concerns the genus of the formal cause of the same, and it is: whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed down in Sacred Scripture. The third pertains to the genus of the material cause, and it is: whether theology is about God as about its first subject. The fourth and fifth pertain to the genus of final cause, and the fourth is: whether theology is practical; the fifth: whether a practical science is so called per se from order to praxis and end.” ¹is whether it was necessary for man in this present state that some special doctrine, namely one which he could not reach by the natural light of the intellect, be supernaturally inspired.

And that it was not necessary I argue thus:

EveryText marked by Scotus with the sign a. ² power having something common for its prime object is naturally capable of whatever is contained under that object just as it is capable of the per se natural object. This is proved by the example of the prime object of sight and of the other things contained under it, and thus by induction it is proved in the case of other prime objects and powers.

It is also proved by reason, because the prime object is said to be that which is commensurate with the power; but if its nature, that is, the nature of the prime object, were in something about which the power was unable to be active, the power would not be commensurate but the object would exceed the power. The major premise, then, is plain. But the prime natural object of our intellect is being insofar as it is being;  therefore our intellect is naturally able to be active about any being whatever, and thus about any intelligible non-being, because the negative term is known through the affirmative term. Therefore , etc     . The proof of the minor is in Avicenna Metaphysics 1.6 (72rb): “Being and reality are imprinted in the soul on first impression, and these cannot be made manifest by other things;” but if there were some prime object other than them, they could be made manifest by the idea of that prime object; but this is impossible.Note by Scotus: “In this question note a, b, c for the principle; next, for the difficulties, d, e, f, g; they are done in the second question [n.95]. Note, a is valid for distinction 3 [I d.3 p.1], and c for question 1 [ibid., qq.1-2]; b and the following are common in supernatural matters; d, e for the question about the science of theology for us [n.124].” ³

2. In addition, Text marked by Scotus with the sign b. ⁴the senses do not need, for this present life, any supernatural cognition; therefore neither does the intellect. The antecedent is plain. The proof of the consequence is: “Nature does not fail in things necessary,” On the Soul, 3.9.432b21-22; but if it does not fail in things that are imperfect, much more does it not fail in those that are perfect;     therefore if it does not fail in the inferior powers as to what is necessary for them to accomplish their acts and attain their end, much more does it not fail in what is necessary for the higher power to attain their act and end. Therefore etc     .

3. In addition, if some such doctrine is necessary, it is because the power in its pure natural state is not commensurate with the knowable object as such; therefore it must be made commensurate by something other than itself. But this something other is either natural or supernatural; if it is natural then the whole thing is incommensurate with the prime object; if it is supernatural, then the power is incommensurate with that supernatural thing, and thus the power must be made commensurate to it by something else, and so on ad infinitum.     Therefore , since an infinite process is impossible, Metaphysics 2.2.994a1-b31, one must stop at the first stage by saying that the intellective power is commensurate with everything knowable and in every way of its being knowable. Therefore , etc     .

4. To the opposite:

2 Timothy 3.16: “All doctrine divinely inspired is useful for reproof..”

In addition, in Baruch 3.31-32 it is said of wisdom: “There is none who knows her ways, but he who knows all things knows her;” therefore no one else can have wisdom except from him who knows all things. This, then, as to the necessity for it. But about the fact he subjoins, v.37: “He handed it on to Jacob his son and to Israel his beloved,” as to the Old Testament; and then follows, v.38: “After this he is seen on earth and conversed with men,” as to the New Testament.

I. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians

5. On this question there seems to be a controversy between philosophers and theologians. And the philosophers maintain the perfection of nature and deny a supernatural perfection; but the theologians acknowledge a defect of nature and a necessity of grace and a supernatural perfection.Interpolation: “and so they honor it more.” ⁵

A. Opinion of the Philosophers

A philosopher might say, then, that no supernatural knowledge is necessary for man in this present life, but that he can acquire all knowledge necessary for himself from the activity of natural causes. Adduced for this are both the authority and also the reasoning of the Philosopher in diverse places.

6. First, On the Soul 3.5.430a14-15, where he says that “the agent intellect is that whereby it makes all things and the possible intellect that whereby it becomes all things.” From this I thus argue: Text marked by Scotus with the sign c. ⁶when that which is naturally active and that which is naturally passive are brought together and are not impeded, action necessarily follows, because action depends essentially on these alone as on prior causes; but the active element with respect to every intelligible is the agent intellect, and the passive element the possible intellect, and these are naturally in the soul and are not impeded. The thing is plain. Therefore, by the natural virtue of these two, the act of understanding can ensue with respect to any intelligible whatever.

7. There is a confirmation by reason: to every natural passive power there corresponds something naturally active, otherwise the passive power would in nature be in vain if it could be reduced to act by nothing in nature; but the possible intellect is the passive power with respect to any intelligible whatever; so to it there corresponds some natural active power. The proposed conclusion then follows. The minor premise is plain, because the possible intellect naturally desires knowledge of any knowable thing whatever; it is also naturally perfected by any knowledge whatever; therefore it is naturally receptive of any understanding whatever.

8. In addition, Text marked by Scotus with the sign f ⁷in Metaphysics 6.1.1026a18-19, there is a distinction of theoretical habits into the mathematical, the physical, and the metaphysical; and from the proof of this in the same place it does not seem possible for there to be more theoretical habits, because in those habits the whole of being, both in itself and in its parts, is considered. But just as there could not be any theoretical science other than these, so neither could there be any practical science other than the acquired active and productive sciences. Therefore the acquired practical sciences are sufficient for perfecting the practical intellect, and the acquired theoretical sciences sufficient for perfecting the theoretical intellect.

9. In addition, Text marked by Scotus with the sign d. ⁸that which is naturally able to understand the principle can naturally know the conclusions contained in the principle. I prove this conclusion from the fact that the knowledge of the conclusions depends only on the understanding of the principle and on the deduction of the conclusions from the principle, as is plain from the definition of ‘know’ in Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b9-12; but a deduction is manifest of itself, as is plain from the definition of the perfect syllogism, Prior Analytics 1.1.24b22-24, because “it is in need of nothing for being or appearing clearly necessary;” therefore if the principles are understood, there is possession of everything that is necessary for knowledge of the conclusion. And thus the major is plain.

10. But we naturally understand the first principles, and in these principles all the conclusions are contained; therefore we can naturally know all knowable conclusions.

Proof of the first part of the minor: because the terms of the first principles are the most common terms, therefore we can naturally understand them, because from Physics 1.1.184a21-22 the most common things are understood first; Interpolation (in place of “therefore.. .understood first”): “therefore we can naturally understand them, because, from Physics 1, the most common things are understood first by us, and also because they are as it were the doorways in[to] the house, Metaphysics 2.1.993b4-5.” ⁹“but we know and understand the principles insofar as we know the terms,” Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b23-25; therefore we can naturally know the first principles.

11. Proof of the second part of the minor: because the terms of the first principles are the most common, therefore, when they are distributed, they are distributed for all the subordinate concepts; now, such terms are taken universally in the first principles and thus they extend to all particular concepts, and so as a result to the extremes of all special conclusions.Interpolation: “And thus is this second part of the minor proved.” ¹⁰

B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers

12. Against this position one can argue in three ways.These arguments are derived variously from Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, though primarily from the latter. ¹¹

Note: it cannot be shown by natural reason that something supernatural exists in the wayfarer, nor that it is required necessarily for his perfection, nor even can he who has it know that it is present in him. Therefore it is impossible to use natural reason here against Aristotle; if one argues from things believed, it is not a reason against the philosopher, because he will not concede the believed premise. Hence the reasons given against him here possess one or other premise as something believed, or as proved from something believed; therefore they are only persuasive theologically, from things believed to a thing believed.

13. [First principal reason] - First thus: everything that acts through knowledge has need of distinct knowledge of its end. I prove this because everything that acts for an end acts from desire of the end; everything that per se acts, acts for an end; therefore everything that per se acts desires the end in its own particular way. Therefore, just as a natural agent needs desire of the end for which it must act, so a thing that acts by knowledge - which is also a per se agent, from Physics 2.5.196b17-22 - needs desire of the end for which it must act. The major then is plain.

But man cannot from his natural powers distinctly know his end; therefore he needs some supernatural knowledge of it.

14. The minor is plain: first, because the Philosopher, following natural reason, lays down that happiness is perfected in the acquired knowledge of separate substances, as he seems to mean in the Ethics 1.6.1097b22-98a20, 10.7.1177a12-b1, 10.8.1178b7-32, 10.9.1179a22-32, or, if he does not determinately assert that it is the supreme perfection possible for us, he does not conclude anything else by natural reason, so that, by relying on natural reason alone, he will either be in error or remain in doubt about the end in its particular nature; Note by Scotus: “This is something believed.” ¹²hence in the Ethics 1.10.1099b11-13 he says hesitatingly “if any gift is from the gods, it is reasonable that happiness is.”

15. Second, the same minor is proved through reason, because the proper end of any substance is not known to us save from the acts of it that are manifest to us, from which acts is shown that such an end is fitting for such a nature; Interpolation: “This is plain from the descent of a heavy object downward, which descent is an act of the heavy object with respect to the center and end.” ¹³in this present life we do not experience or know that any acts are present in our nature from which we might know that the vision of separate substances is fitting for us; therefore we cannot naturally know distinctly that that end is fitting for our nature.

16. From this it is at least certain that some conditions of the end, on whose account it is more desirable and more fervently to be sought, cannot be determinately known by natural reason. For even if it were granted that reason was sufficient to prove that the end of man is the pure vision and enjoyment of God, yet the conclusion will not follow that these fittingly belong in perpetuity to the man perfect in soul and body, the way it will be said in 4 d.43 q.2 n.32. And yet the perpetuity of a good of this sort is a condition that renders the end more desirable than it would if it were transitory. For to obtain this good in a perfect nature is more desirable than to obtain it in a separated soul, as is plain from Augustine The Literal Meaning of Genesis bk. 12. ch. 35 n.68. These and the like conditions of the end must be known, then, if the end is to be efficaciously sought, and yet natural reason is not sufficient for them; therefore a doctrine delivered supernaturally is required.

17. [Second Principal Reason] - Second, thus:Note by Scotus: “This proceeds of contingent things; therefore it does not proceed of knowable things.” ¹⁴ every knower that acts for an end needs knowledge of how and in what way such an end may be acquired; and also he needs knowledge of all the things that are necessary for the end; and, third, he needs knowledge that all those things are sufficient for such an end. The first condition is plain, because if he does not know how and in what way the end may be acquired, he will not know how to dispose himself so as to obtain it. The second condition is proved because if he does not know everything necessary for the end, he could, because of ignorance of some act necessary for it, fail of the end. Also, as to the third condition, if those necessary things are not known to be sufficient, he will, from doubt that he is ignorant of something necessary, not pursue what is necessary in an effective way.

18. But these three conditions cannot be known to the wayfarer by natural reason. The proof of the first is that beatitude is conferred as a reward for the merits that God accepts as worthy of such a reward, and so as a result beatitude does not follow by natural necessity on any acts whatever of our own, but it is a contingent gift of God, who accepts some acts in their order to him as meritorious. Note by Scotus: “This is something believed.” ¹⁵This fact, as it seems, is not naturally knowable, because here too the philosophers erred, laying down that everything that is from God proceeds from him by necessity. The other two conditions, at any rate, are manifest: for the acceptance by the divine will, insofar as it contingently accepts such and such things as worthy of eternal life, cannot be known by natural reason, nor too that these things are sufficient; it all depends on the divine will in respect of those things the divine will is in a contingent way related to;     therefore , etc     .

19. [Instances against the two Principal Reasons] - Against these two reasons an instance is given. Against the first thus: every created nature depends essentially on any per se cause of it at all and, on account of such dependence, knowledge can be had from the thing caused by a ‘proof-that’, A proof from effects to cause, Posterior Analytics 1.13.78a22-b34, as opposed to a ‘proof-why’, which is from causes to effects. ¹⁶and any per se cause of it at all can be known; therefore, since the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, because it is not incommensurate with his cognitive power, the conclusion follows that the end of the nature can be naturally known from knowledge of the nature.Note by Scotus: “I concede that the end which is the final cause is known, and this in the respect in which it is final cause, and that it is known in like manner as the efficient cause is known in the respect in which it must necessarily be the first efficient cause” [n.29]. ¹⁷

20. Confirmation of the reason: for if the end of a lower nature is known from knowledge of that nature, no less is this possible in the proposed case, because there is in the proposed case no lesser dependence of a determinate thing on its end than in other cases.

21. From this reason too it seems that the proposition ‘the end of a substance is not known save from its acts’, which was assumed in the proof of the minor, is false, because the end of a nature can from the knowledge of that nature in itself be known by a ‘proof-that’.

22. But if it be said the reason concludes that man can naturally know his natural end but not his supernatural end, on the contrary Augustine says, On Predestination Sanctorum ch.5 n.10: “Being able to have faith, like being able to have charity, belongs to the nature of men, although having faith, like having charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful.” If, therefore, the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, then that ability as belonging to such a nature, and consequently such a nature’s directability to the end for which faith and charity dispose it, are also naturally knowable to him.

23. Again, man naturally desires the end which you say is supernatural; therefore he is naturally directed to that end; therefore that end can be concluded from such directedness as from knowledge of the nature directed to it.

24. Again, that the prime object of the intellect is being is naturally knowable, according to Avicenna Metaphysics 1.6 (72rb), and naturally knowable is that the nature of being is most perfectly realized in God; but the end of any power is the best of the things that are contained under its prime object, because in that alone is there perfect rest and delight, from the Ethics 10.4.1174b14-23; therefore it is naturally knowable to man that he is in respect of his intellect directed to God as to his end.

25. The reason is confirmed, because what the prime object is of some power is naturally knowable to him to whom the power is naturally knowable, and, further, he can know what the nature of that prime object is realized in and that the most perfect such thing is the end of the power; but the mind is known to itself, according to Augustine On the Trinity bk.11 chs.11-12, nn.16, 18; therefore what is its prime object is known to it. Also known to it is that God is not transcended by the nature of that prime object, because then God would be in no way intelligible by the mind; therefore it knows that God is the best thing in which the nature of its object is realized, and so it knows that he is the end of the power.

26. Against the second reason [nn.17-18] the argument runs as follows: if through one extreme the other extreme is known, therefore the means in between are known; but the means between the nature and the end of it that is to be obtained are necessary for obtaining the end; therefore, since, according to what was proved above [n.19], the end can be known from knowledge of the nature, it seems that the means necessary for the end can in like manner be known.

27. The reason is confirmed: for it thus seems that the connection of the things to the end is just as necessary in the proposed case as it is in other cases; but on account of this sort of connection in other cases other things are known from the end, as that from the nature of health is deduced that such and such things are required for health;     therefore etc     .

28 [Response to the Instances] - To the first of these instances [nn.19-21] I say that, although the process of reasoning is from the end which is the final cause and not from the end that must be attained by operation - the distinction between these ends will be stated below (1 d.1 p.1 q.1 n.5) - yet with a single response it can be said to the instance, and to the next one about Augustine, and to the third one about the power and the prime object, that all of these accept that our nature or intellective power is naturally knowable to us; but this is false in that proper and special respect under which our nature or intellective power is ordered to this sort of end and is capable of complete grace and has God for its most perfect object. For our soul and our nature are only known to us in this present life under some general reason that is capable of being abstracted from sensible things, as will appear below in 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 n.24. And according to such a general reason it does not fittingly belong to our soul or nature to be ordered to that end, or to be capable of receiving grace, or to have God for most perfect object.

29. Next to the form. When it is said [n.19] that from a thing that exists for an end the end can be demonstrated by a ‘proof-that’, I say that it is not true unless the thing that exists for an end is known under the proper reason under which it has that end. Thus the minor is false. - And when proof is given by commensuration [n.19], I say that the mind, although it is the same as itself, is yet not in this present life capable of being commensurate as an object with itself save in accord with the general reasons that are abstractable from sensible things.

30. To the confirmation [n.20] I say that the proper ends of other substances are not known either, namely the ends that belong to them according to their proper reasons, unless some acts are manifest from which the order of those substances to such end may be deduced.

31. And from this the response to what is added [n.21] against the proof of the minor is clear, because the proposition ‘the proper end of a substance is not known to us save by a manifest act of it’ [n.15] is not false; for the proposition does not suppose that the end could not be known in some other way. For the truth very much is that if a substance were known under its proper nature, from this knowledge of it the per se cause of it might be known. But no substance is now thus known to us, and therefore we can conclude to no end proper to a substance save through an evident act of the substance as that substance is known universally and confusedly. Both these ways are lacking in the proposed case; but the proof of the minor [n.15] touches on one of them, that about ignorance of the act, and it supposes the other, namely that about the ignorance of the nature in itself.

32. To the second instance about Augustine [n.22] I say that the power to have charity, as it is a disposition under the proper idea of love with respect to God in himself, is fitting to man’s nature in accord with a special reason, not with a reason common to himself and to sensible things; therefore the potentiality is not naturally knowable about man in this present life, just as man too is not known under the reason in which this power belongs to him. Interpolation: “Or Augustine means that in nature it is a power for receiving. But it cannot be reduced to act by nature.” ¹⁸Such is my reply to the instance insofar as it can be adduced for the principal conclusion [nn.19-20], namely the one opposite to the minor of the first reason [nn.14-15]. But insofar as it is adduced against the response about the supernatural and natural end [n.22] my reply is: I concede that God is the natural end of man, but as obtainable supernaturally and not naturally. And this is proved by the subsequent reason about natural desire [n.23], which I concede.

33. To the other argument [n.24], one must deny what it assumes, namely that it is naturally known that being is the prime object of our intellect, and that it is so in respect of the total indeterminacy of being to sensible and non-sensible things; and this is what Avicenna says is naturally known. For he has mixed his sect - which was the sect of Mohammed - together with philosophical matters, and some things he has said that are philosophical and proved by reason, others that are in conformity with his sect; he expressly lays down in his Metaphysics 9.7 (107ra)Scotus left the space for ‘9.7’ blank. ¹⁹ that the separated soul knows immaterial substance in itself, and therefore he had to lay down that immaterial substance was included under the prime object of the intellect. Not thus Aristotle [On the Soul 3.6.430b27-29], but according to him the prime object of our intellect is or seems to be sensible quiddity, and this either sensible in itself or in its inferior; and this is the quiddity that is abstractable from sensible things.Interpolation: “But if one opposes to this that, if material quiddity is the first and adequate object of the intellective power, then the intellect will not be able to understand anything about separate substance, because an adequate object includes virtually or formally everything that the power can be made to bear on - but material quiddity contains separate substances neither virtually nor formally, therefore etc. - I say that the assumption is not true, because the five common sensibles, namely number, figure, etc., are sensed per se by the sense of sight, which sensibles are not included either virtually or formally under color or light; for it is enough that some things are contents of concomitance.” ²⁰

34. But as to what is said in confirmation of the reason from Augustine [n.25] my reply is: I say that the statement of Augustine must be understood of first act, which is altogether sufficient of itself as to second act but is now however impeded; and because of this impediment the second act is not now elicited from the first act. But of this more below [1 d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.24-25].

35. If it is objected to this that man in the state of nature, when that state was established, could, by the deduction of the first reason [n.19], know his nature and therefore the end of his nature; therefore that knowledge is not supernatural.

36. Again, if it is objected to the response to the final reason [n.33]: if what the prime object is of the intellect is for this reason not known that the intellect is not known in every proper respect in which it has regard to the object, then it cannot be known about anything at all that it is intelligible, because the power is not known in every proper respect in which it has regard to anything at all as to an intelligible object.

37. I reply: to the first objection [n.35] one would need to say of what sort the knowledge of man was when he was established, which may be put off to another occasion [4 d.1 p.2 q.2 n.7]. However at least in respect of the wayfarer in this present life the said knowledge is supernatural, because it exceeds his natural faculty; natural, I say, in the sense of in accord with the state of fallen nature.

38. To the second [n.36] I concede that knowledge of the soul now, or of any of its powers, is not had so distinctly that from it could be known that some intelligible object corresponds to it; but we deduce from the act itself which we experience that the power and nature of which it is the act have respect to the object as to the object which we perceive to be attained by the act, such that we do not deduce the object of the power from knowledge of the power in itself but from knowledge of the act which we experience. But we can have neither of these knowledges about a supernatural object; and for this reason both ways of knowing the proper end of that nature are there lacking.

39. To the argument [n.26] against the second reason, it is plain that it supposes something [n.19] already denied [nn.28-29]. - To the confirmation [n.27] for the reason I say that when the end naturally follows the things that are for the end, and naturally requires them in advance, then the things that are for the end can be deduced from the end; here, however, the attainment is not natural but is only an acceptance by the divine will that rewards the merits as worthy of such end.

40. [Third Principal Reason] - Again, Text marked by Scotus with the sign g [n.27]. ²¹there is a third principal argument against the opinion of the philosophers. Metaphysics 6.1.1026a21-23: the knowledge of separate substances is the most noble because it is about the noblest kind of being; therefore knowledge of their characteristic properties is most noble and necessary, for those properties are more perfect knowables than are the ones they share with sensibles. But we cannot know those properties from pure natural powers alone. First, because if some science taught that it finds those properties in a way that is possible way, it would be the science of metaphysics; but a metaphysics about the characteristic features of those separate substances cannot be naturally had by us, as is plain.Addition cancelled by Scotus: “because they are not included virtually in the prime object of metaphysics, namely in being.” ²² And this is what the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 1.2.982a8-10, that the wise man must know all things somehow and not in particular; and he subjoins: “For he who knows the universals somehow knows all the things under them.” He there calls the metaphysician ‘the wise man’, just as he there calls metaphysics ‘wisdom’.

41. Second, I prove the same because those properties are not known by a ‘knowledge-why’ unless the proper subjects are known, which alone include the proper ‘why’; but their proper subjects are not naturally knowable to us;     therefore etc     .

Nor do we know their properties by a ‘demonstration-that’ and from the effects. Here is the proof; for the effects either leave the intellect in doubt as to those properties, or lead them away into error. And this is clear from the properties of the first immaterial substance in itself; for a property of it is that it is communicable to three; but the effects do not show this property, because these do not come from it insofar as it is three. And if an argument is made from the effects to the cause, the effects lead rather to the opposite and to error, because in no effect is there found one nature save in one supposit. It is also a property of that nature to be a contingent cause of things outside it; and the effects lead rather to the opposite of this, to error, as is plain from the opinion of the philosophers who posit that the first thing causes necessarily whatever it causes. Interpolation: “A philosopher might say to this reason that what it is impossible for us to know it is not necessary for us to know; but it is impossible for us to have of the properties of separate substances any knowledge, whether by nature or infused, save as we now have it - and therefore it is not necessary that knowledge be infused for knowledge of the properties of separate substances.” ²³About the properties of other substances too the same is plain, because the effects, according to the philosophers, lead rather to the eternity and necessity of those properties than to their contingency and newness. Likewise, the philosophers also seem to conclude from the celestial motions that the number of those separate substances accords with the number of the motions. Likewise, that those substances are naturally blessed and incapable of sin. All which things are absurd.Interpolation: “Again, from the motion of the heaven it turns out that the angels are always moving it, nor could the heaven be greater, on account of the labor of the angel doing the moving - so that if one star be added, the angel could not move it etc” [Aristotle De Caelo 2.1.284a14-18]. ²⁴

42. [Instance against the Third Principal Reason] - Against this reason I argue that any necessary property at all of separate substances that is now known to us by faith or common revelation could be known by natural knowledge. And this as follows: Text marked by Scotus with the sign e. ²⁵those necessary properties of which we naturally know the terms we can also naturally comprehend; but we naturally know the terms of all the necessary things that have been revealed;     therefore etc     .

43. Proof of the major: those necessary things are either mediate or immediate; if they are immediate, then they are known when the terms are known, Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b23-25; if they are mediate, then when we are able to know the extremes we are able to conceive the mean between them. And by conjoining the mean with either extreme, we get either mediate or immediate premises; if the premises are immediate, the same as before; if mediate, the process continues by knowing the mean between the extremes and by conjoining it with the extremes, until we come to things immediate. Therefore ultimately we will come down to immediate necessities that we understand from the terms, from which all the mediate necessities follow; therefore we will be able naturally to know those mediates through the immediates.

44. Proof of the principal minor, because to have and not to have faith, being contradictories to each other, are not contradictory in words only but in concepts, as is plain when a philosopher and a theologian contradict each other over ‘God is triune,’ where one of them denies and the other affirms not only the same name but the same concept; therefore every simple concept that the one has the other has.

45. [Response to the Instance] - To this instance I reply: There exist some immediate truths about separate substances. I take then some such first and immediate truth, and let it be a. In it are included many mediate truths, as for instance all those that in particular assert things common to the predicate of things common to the subject; let them be called b, c. Those true mediate assertions do not have their truth save from something immediate. Therefore they are not naturally known save from the understanding of that something immediate. If therefore some intellect could understand the terms in b and combine them with each other, but could not understand the terms in a nor consequently a itself, b will be indeterminate for his intellect, because it will not be known either from itself or from an immediate proposition, because this latter is, by supposition, not known. Such is how it is with us, because we have certain common concepts about material and immaterial substances, and we can combine them with each other; but the complexes we thus form are not evident save from the true immediate propositions that are about those essences in their proper and special idea; but we do not conceive those essences under this idea, and so we do not know those general truths about the general concepts.

46. An example: if it were impossible for someone to conceive a triangle in its proper idea, although he could abstract and conceive the idea of the figure from a quadrilateral, it would also be impossible for him to conceive a triangle’s primacy as this primacy is a proper quality of a triangle, because it is not in this way conceived except when it is abstracted from triangle; yet he could abstract primacy from other primacies, as for instance primacy in numbers. Although this intellect could form this composite ‘some figure is primary’, because it can apprehend its terms, yet the composite when formed will be indeterminate for it, because it is a mediate one included in the immediate proposition ‘the triangle is primary in this way’; and because he cannot understand this immediate proposition, because he cannot understand its terms either, therefore he cannot know the mediate proposition, which only has its evidence from the immediate one.

47. Hereby to the argument [n.42]: I deny the major; to the proof [n.43] I say that those necessary things are mediate. - And when you say ‘therefore we can conceive the mean between the extremes’, I deny the consequence, because the mean between the extremes is sometimes ordered essentially between them, for example the definition of one or other extreme, or a property that is prior in respect of a later property; and such is a mean for universally proving the extreme of the extreme. I therefore concede that whoever can understand the extremes can understand such a mean between the extremes, because the understanding of it is included in one or other extreme, or is the same as one or other extreme. But if the mean is a particular, contained under one or other extreme and not essentially between the extremes, then it is not necessary that he who can understand the general extremes can conceive the mean that is particular to the extremes. Thus it is here. For a whatness that has in its proper and particular idea some property immediately inhering in it, is a mean inferior to the common concept about which the property in the common concept is asserted; and so it is not a mean for proving the property of the common term universally, but only particularly. This is plain in the example [n.46], because it is not necessary that he who is able to conceive figure in general and primacy in general could conceive triangle in particular, because triangle is a mean contained under ‘figure’; a mean, I say, for proving primacy of a figure in particular.

48. This third reason [n.40] is especially conclusive about the first immaterial substance, because knowledge of it as the beatific object is especially necessary. And then the response to the objection [n.42] against it: namely the supposition is that we do not now naturally conceive God save in a concept common to him and to sensibles, which point will be expounded below, in 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 nn.5-10. Even if that supposition is denied, one must still say that the concept which can be made about God by virtue of a creature is imperfect; but the concept that might be made by virtue of the very essence in itself would be perfect. So, just as we spoke about general and special concept [n.47], let us thus in another way speak about perfect and imperfect concept.

49. [Fourth Principal Reason]. Fourth it is argued thus: a thing that is ordered to some end for which it is not disposed must be little by little moved to the disposition for that end; man is ordered to a supernatural end for which he is not of himself disposed; therefore he needs to be disposed little by little for possessing that end. This is done through some supernatural imperfect knowledge of the sort set down as necessary.

50. But if it be instanced that a perfect agent can remove an imperfection and act at once, I reply: although this might be possible by absolute power, yet it is more perfect to communicate activity to the creature with respect to obtaining its own perfection than not to communicate it; but man can have some activity with respect to his own final perfection; therefore it is more perfect that this be communicated to him. But this would not be possible without some imperfect knowledge preceding the perfect knowledge toward which it is finally directed.

51. [Fifth Principal Reason]. Fifth, it is argued thus: every agent using an instrument in its acting has through that instrument no power for any action that exceeds the nature of the instrument; but the light of the agent intellect is the instrument which the soul now uses in its natural understanding;     therefore it has through that light no power for any action that exceeds that light. But that light is of itself limited to acquiring knowledge in a sensitive way through means of the senses; therefore the soul has no power for any knowledge that cannot be had by means of sense. But knowledge of many other things is necessary for this present life; therefore etc     .

52. This reason seems to produce a conclusion contrary to him who has made it. For, according to this deduction, the uncreated light will not be able to use the agent intellect as an instrument for knowledge of any pure truth, because, according to him, such cannot be had by means of the senses without special illumination. And thus it follows that in the knowledge of pure truth the light of the agent intellect does not in any way perform any action; but this seems problematic, because this action is more perfect than any understanding; and consequently that which is more perfect in the soul insofar as the soul is intellective ought to contribute in some way to the action.

53. [To the Fourth and Fifth Reason]. These two final reasons [nn.49, 51] do not seem as effective as they could be. For the first would be effective if it had been proved that man is ordered finally to supernatural knowledge (the proof of which pertains to the question about beatitude, 4 Suppl. d.49 q.7 nn.2-7), and if along with this it were shown that natural knowledge does not in this present life sufficiently dispose for attaining supernatural knowledge. The second reason begs two questions, namely that there is need for knowledge of certain things that cannot be known by means of the senses, and that the light of the agent intellect is limited to knowables of that sort.

54. The first three reasons [nn. 13, 17, 40] appear more probable.

However, that no such knowledge is necessary for salvation I prove:Note by Scotus: “‘Suppose there is someone non-baptized’ etc. see above at the sign o#o.” Interpolation: “But against the principal conclusion, namely that supernatural knowledge is not necessary for man for salvation, one could argue thus.” ²⁶

Suppose there is someone who is not baptized; although he is an adult, has no one to teach him, he has the sort of good motions in conformity with right reason that he is capable of having, and he avoids the things that natural reason shows him to be bad.

Although God by common law would visit such a person and teach him through a man or an angel - in the way he visited Cornelius, Acts 10.1-48 - nevertheless suppose him not taught by anyone, he will be saved. Likewise, although he were taught later, yet he was just before and so worthy of eternal life, because by willing the good things that precede teaching he merits the grace whereby he is just; and yet he does not have theological knowledge, even as to the first objects of faith, but only natural knowledge. Therefore nothing of theology is simply necessary for salvation.

55. One could say that by meriting things good in their kind he merits by congruity to be justified from original sin, and God does not deny the gift of his liberality; therefore he gives the first grace without a sacrament, because he is not bound by the sacraments; grace is not given without the habit of faith; therefore that person has the habit of theology, although he is not able to activate it, just as neither is he baptized unless he is instructed. And although there is no contradiction in grace being given without faith, since the habits are distinct and exist in different powers, nevertheless just as in baptism the supposition is that these are infused simultaneously, so for the same reason simultaneity can be supposed in this case. For God is not less gracious to him whom without a sacrament he justifies because of his merit by congruity, than to him whom he justifies in the reception of the sacrament without any merit of his own. Therefore it is possible for God by his absolute power to save anyone he likes, and also to bring it about that the latter deserves glory without infused faith, if, in the absence of it, he gives the grace which the possessor uses well as far as to willing what he is able to acquire in accord with natural reason and acquired faith, or without any acquired faith if a teacher is lacking; although by his ordained power God does not give grace without the preceding habit of faith, because grace is supposed not to be infused without it; not because of any need, as if grace without it would not be sufficient, but because of divine liberality, which reforms the whole man; also a man would, without infused faith, be less perfectly disposed as to assenting to certain truths.

56. And as in this case, so analogously about the habit of theology I say that the perfectly existing habit includes infused and acquired faith of the articles and other things revealed by God in Scripture, such that it is not infused faith alone nor acquired faith alone but both together. Theology is therefore necessary, but it is so when speaking of ordained power and when speaking of the more principal or prior habit that pertains to theology, namely the one which is infused faith, and this in general as far as concerns everyone; it is not so as far as concerns the second habit that it includes, which is acquired faith, although perhaps it is by ordained power necessary in an adult who is able to have a teacher and can understand him, and can do so as far as concerns acquired faith of certain general things.

II. Solution of the Question

57. To the question, then, I reply by first distinguishing how something may be said to be supernatural. Interpolation [from Appendix A]: “Against the things said, by responding to the question: for he seems to want the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ to be taken chiefly by comparing the receptive power with the act and the form and in no way by comparing it with the agent; he seems also second to want the distinction of natural and supernatural to be taken chiefly by comparing the passive power with the agent and not by comparing it with the act and the form. Therefore, as to these points, I proceed thus against him: I will show first that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ should be taken by comparison with the agent; second that it should not be taken chiefly by comparison with the act; third that the distinction of natural and supernatural should be taken by comparison with the act and the form and the second causes; fourth I will solve the reasons he has on his behalf. The first is proved in this way, by the Commentator on De Anima 2 com.26: “Demonstrative definitions are naturally fitted to give causes for everything in the thing defined;” but the violent is defined by comparing the passive power with the agent; therefore the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ has its place by comparison with the agent. The minor is plain, because “the violent is that whose principle is extrinsic, with the thing suffering the violence contributing nothing” Ethics 3.3.1110b15-17; but the extrinsic principle is the agent; therefore etc. Secondly, the same thing is argued thus: that by which certain things differ formally from each other seems to be the formal principle of the distinction between them; but the natural and the violent differ formally by having their principle within and without; therefore etc. The minor is proved by Aristotle, Physics 2.1.192b20-23 where, in expounding the definition of nature, he says about the same thing: ‘in that in which it is’.” ²⁷For a receptive power is compared with the act that it receives or with the agent from which it receives it. In the first way it is a natural power, or a violent one, or neither. It is called natural if it is naturally inclined to receive what it receives, violent if it does so against nature, neither if it is naturally inclined neither to the form which it receives nor to the opposite form. But when the comparison is taken in this way there is nothing supernatural in it. But if the receiver is compared with the agent from which it receives the form, then the case is natural when the receiver is compared with such an agent as has the nature of naturally impressing such a form on such a receiver, but supernatural when the receiver is compared with an agent that does not naturally impress the form on that receiver.

Before this distinction is applied to the proposed case, there is a multiple argument against it; both that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ is taken from the comparison of the receiver to the agent and not only from the comparison of it to the form, and that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ is taken from the comparison of the receiver to the form and not only from its respect to the agent. But these arguments are not set down here [they are set down in 4 d.43 q.4 nn.4-5].

59. However, a reasonable solution is apparent, because that thing is the per se cause of something on which, when it is posited, and when any other thing has been excluded or varied, the effect follows. But in the present case, although the form against which the receiver is inclined is not introduced except by an agent acting violently on the receiver, and although a supernatural agent does not act supernaturally except by introducing a form, yet the per se idea of ‘violent’ is taken from the relation of the receiver to the form, and the per se idea of ‘supernatural’ is taken from the relation of the receiver to the agent. The proof is that when the receiver and the form remain in their own nature (for example, that the form can be received but against the inclination of the receiver), then, however the agent is varied, the receiver receives it violently; likewise, when the receiver and the agent are so disposed that only an agent not acting naturally changes the receiver (‘only’ I say in the sense that a natural agent does not dispose it), then whatever form the agent introduces will be supernatural with respect to the receiver.

This is proved secondly in this way, that the form is supernatural not only in ‘being introduced’ but also in ‘persisting’; in one way a form persists without extrinsic action in a receiver violently, although not for a long time, in another it persists naturally and for a long time; in one way it remains natural, in another supernatural, on account of the agent only, such that, by excluding the agent by which the thing is done, it could not be said to be supernatural; but it could be said to be natural, because the perfection, when the comparison is of the form to the receiver only, is natural.

60. Applying this then to the proposed case, I say that when comparing the possible intellect with the actual knowledge in itself there is no supernatural knowledge, because the possible intellect is naturally perfected by any knowledge whatever and it naturally inclines to any knowledge whatever. But speaking in the second way [n.57], it is supernatural in this sense, that it is generated by an agent that does not have the nature to move the possible intellect naturally to such knowledge.

61. Now for this present life, according to the Philosopher [On the Soul 3.4.429a13-18, 5.430a14-17, 7.431a14-17, 8.432a8-10], the possible intellect has the nature to be moved to knowledge by the agent intellect and by a sensible phantasm, therefore only that knowledge is natural to it which is impressed on it by those agents.

Now by virtue of those agents all knowledge that is had of a concept by a wayfarer in accord with ordinary law can be had, as is plain in the instance [n.42] against the third principal reason. And therefore, although God could, by a special revelation, cause knowledge of some concept, as in the case of rapture, yet such supernatural knowledge is not of ordinary law necessary.

63. But as to propositional truths it is otherwise because, as was shown by the three first reasons adduced against the first opinion [nn.13-18, 40-41], after the whole action of the agent intellect and of sensible phantasms has been put in place, many propositions will remain unknown to us and neutral to us of which the knowledge is necessary for us. Therefore knowledge of these things must be delivered to us supernaturally, because no one can naturally discover the knowledge of them and deliver it to others by teaching, because since they were by natural powers neutral for one person so were they neutral for anyone else. But whether, after the first handing down of teaching about such things, someone else could, by natural powers, assent to the doctrine handed down, see 3. Suppl. d.23 q.un. nn.4-5. Now this first handing down of such doctrine is called revelation, which is for this reason supernatural, that it is from an agent which is, for this present life, not naturally a mover of the intellect.

63. In another way too an action or knowledge could be said to be supernatural because it is from an agent supplying the place of the supernatural object. For an object having the nature to cause knowledge of this truth ‘God is triune’, and of similar ones, is the divine essence known under its proper idea; it is, as knowable under this idea, a supernatural object. Any agent, then, which causes some knowledge of the truths that have the nature to be evident through such an object thus known, that agent is in this respect supplying the place of the object. But if the agent were to cause of those truths a perfect knowledge of the sort that the object in itself would cause, then the agent would perfectly supply the place of the object; to the extent the knowledge it causes is imperfect this knowledge is virtually contained in the perfect knowledge of which the object would be in itself the cause.

64. So it is in the proposed case. For he who reveals ‘God is triune’ causes in the mind some knowledge, though an obscure knowledge, of this truth, because it is about an object not known under its proper idea, which object, if it were thus known, would naturally cause a perfect and clear knowledge of that truth. To the extent, then, that this knowledge is obscure and is included eminently in the clear knowledge, as the imperfect in the perfect, to that same extent the revealer or causer of this obscure truth supplies the place of the object which is the cause of the clear knowledge, especially since it cannot cause knowledge of any truth except by supplying the place of some object; nor could it cause about this object knowledge of such truths in the way it supplies the place of some lesser object which is naturally mover of our intellect, because no such object virtually includes any knowledge of those truths, neither clear even nor obscure; therefore it must, in causing even that obscure knowledge, supply in some way the place of the supernatural object.

65. The difference between these two ways of positing the supernaturality of revealed knowledge is plain by separating one from the other. For example, if a supernatural agent were to cause knowledge of a natural object, as suppose it were to infuse geometry into someone, it would be supernatural in the first way [n.60], not in the second [n.63] (I mean, Interpolation: “but if there is any supernatural knowledge in the second way, it is supernatural”, or: “if it were to infuse knowledge of this, ‘God is Triune’ or the like, this knowledge would be supernatural.” ²⁸in both ways, because the second involves the first, though not conversely). But where only the first is, there it is not necessary that it be supernatural such that it not be capable of being possessed naturally; where the second way is, the necessity is that it be possessed supernaturally, because it cannot be possessed naturally.

III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers

66. The three reasons on which this solution rests are confirmed by authorities. The first [nn.13-16] by the authority of Augustine City of God XVII ch.41 n.3: “The philosophers, not knowing to what end those things were to be referred, were able, among the false things they said, to see something true” etc.

67. The second reason [nn.17-18] is confirmed by Augustine City ofGod XI ch.2: “What advantage is it to know whither one should go if the way by which one should go is not known?” On this point the philosophers were in error who, although they handed on some truths about the virtues, yet mixed in falsehoods, according to the preceding authority of Augustine [n.66], and it is plain from their books. For Aristotle blames the polities arranged by many others, Politics 2. But neither is the polity itself of Aristotle free of blame: in the Politics, 7.9.1329a29-32, he teaches that the gods are to be honored (“For it is fitting,” he says, “to give honor to the gods”), and in the same place, 7.16.1335b19-25, he hands on a law “not to nourish anything defective”!

68. The third reason is confirmed by Augustine City of God XI ch.3: “As to things that are remote from our senses, since we cannot know them by our own testimony, we require the testimony of others.” And this confirms the whole of the principal solution. For because the propositions about which our argument is [nn.40-41] are in themselves neutral, no one can believe them on his own testimony, but a supernatural testimony must be required of someone who is above the whole human race.

69. Now in what way the first handing down or revelation of such doctrine could be done or was done is doubtful - whether, that is, it was by interior locution or exterior, along with the use of some signs sufficient to cause assent; but it suffices for the proposed case that such doctrine could have been supernaturally revealed in either way, although it could in neither way have been first handed down by a man without error.

70. Against these three reasons it is at once instanced that they destroy themselves, because a thing that is shown as requiring necessarily to be known is shown to be true, because nothing is known except truth; therefore whatever those reasons show as necessary to be known (namely, that the enjoyment of God in himself is the end of man as to the first reason [nn.13-16], - the way to reach it is through the merits that God accepts as worthy of such reward as to the second reason [nn.17-18], - that God is triune and causes contingently, and the like, as to the third reason [nn.40-41]), all this is shown to be true. Either, then, those reasons only rest on faith, or from them is concluded the opposite of what they prove.

71. I reply: by natural reason it is shown that there is need to know determinately one part of this contradiction, ‘enjoyment is the end, enjoyment is not the end’, that is, that the intellect is not merely doubtful or neutral about this problem, ‘whether enjoyment is the end’, because such doubt or ignorance would impede search for the end; but by natural reason it is not shown that this part needs to be known necessarily. And in this way the aforesaid reasons, insofar as they are natural, conclude to one side of the contradiction, this or that; not about it determinately except only from things believed [cf. n.12].

IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

72. To the arguments [n.6-11] for the opinion of Aristotle. To the first [n.6] I say that knowledge depends on the soul that knows and the object that is known [nn.6-11], because according to Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18 “knowledge is born from knower and known.” Although, therefore, the soul may have within a sufficient active and passive element to the extent an action with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, yet it does not have within itself a sufficient active element to the extent the action agrees with the object, because it is thus a blank tablet, as is said at On the Soul 3.4.429b30-30a2. The intellect then is an agent by which it makes everything, but it is so insofar as ‘making’ with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, not insofar as the object is active.

73. To the confirmation for the reason [n.7]. To the major I say that nature is sometimes taken for the intrinsic principle of motion and rest - as it is described in the Physics 2.1.192b20-23 - sometimes for the naturally active principle, insofar as nature is distinguished from art or from choice on account of their opposite modes of being a principle, whether it is intrinsic or not, provided it be natural. In the first way the major is not true, because there does not naturally correspond to every passive element an active intrinsic principle that is nature, because many things are naturally receptive of some act for which they do not have an active intrinsic principle. In the second way too the major proposition is false in certain cases, namely when a nature, because of its excellence, is naturally ordered to receiving a perfection so eminent that it cannot fall under the causality of an agent that is natural in the second way. Thus it is in the proposed case.

74. When the major is proved [n.7], I say that the passive power is not in vain in nature, because although it cannot by a natural agent be principally reduced to act, yet the disposition for it can be introduced by such an agent, and can by some agent in nature -that is, in the whole system of being and beings - to wit, by the first or supernatural agent, be completely reduced to act.

75. And if it be objected that that cheapens nature because it cannot attain its perfection from its natural powers, although nature fails less in nobler things, from On the Heavens 2.8.290a29-35, I reply: if our happiness consisted in a supreme contemplation of the sort to which we can now naturally attain, the Philosopher would not say [On the Soul 3.9.432b21-22] that nature fails in necessary things. But now I concede that that happiness can be had naturally, and further I say that another more eminent one can be received naturally. Therefore nature is in this respect made more dignified than if that natural one were posited as the supreme one possible for it; nor is it to be wondered at that there is a passive capacity in some nature for a greater perfection than its active causality can extend itself to.

76. What is adduced from the On the Heavens is not relevant to the case, because the Philosopher is speaking there of instruments corresponding to the motive power if it is in the stars. And I concede that universally to a thing to which a power is given that is naturally organic, to it is by nature given an organ, I mean in non-defective things. But in the proposed case a power is given but it is not organic; yet not all the other things have been given that, besides the power, concur in an act. From the Philosopher, then, can be there had that a nature orderable to some act or object naturally has a power for it, and an organ if the power is organic; but of the later things required for act it is not so.

77. It can be said otherwise to the major [n.7] that it is true speaking of a natural passive power as it is a passive power in contrast to an active one, but not as it is a passive power in contrast to a received act. The difference between these two is plain at the beginning of the solution to this question [n.57].

78. The minor [n.7] however is true in the second way, not the first [n.57]. It might also in a third way be easily replied to the minor by denying it, because although absolutely the possible intellect is naturally receptive of such understanding, not however for this present life. But the cause of this will be spoken about below, 1 d.3 p.1 q.2 n.16; q.3 n.2.

79. To the third reason [n.8] examine the response of Thomas in ST Ia q.1 a.1 ad 2, where he responds thus, that “the diverse nature of the knowable introduces a diversity of sciences. For the same conclusion is demonstrated by the astrologer through a mathematical middle term, that is, one abstracted from matter (to wit, the conclusion that the earth is round), and by the natural philosopher through a middle term that is considered in matter. Hence nothing prevents the same things which the philosophical sciences treat of according to how they are knowable by the light of natural reason from being treated of by another science according to how they are known by the light of divine revelation.”

On the contrary: if knowledge of things knowable in theology is handed on or can be handed on in other sciences, although in another light, then theological science about the same things is not necessary. The consequence is clear in his example, because he who knows that the earth is round by a physical middle term does not need the knowledge by a mathematical middle term as if this knowledge were simply necessary.

80. The said response, however, to the third argument is thus expounded, namely that a habit is both a habit and a form; insofar as it is a habit it gets its distinction from the object, but insofar as it is a form it can be distinguished by the active principle. Now with respect to the habit of science principles are efficient causes. Although, therefore, where there is the same knowable (for example, that the earth is round) no distinction is drawn through the objects, yet a distinction is drawn through the principles by which the mathematician and the natural philosopher show this; and thus there will be a distinction of habits insofar as they are forms and not insofar as they are habits.

81. On the contrary: the form is common to the habits; but it is impossible for anything to be distinct from other things under the idea of what is superior but not to be thus distinct under the idea of what is inferior; therefore it is impossible for anything to be distinct under the idea of the form whereby it is a form and yet not distinct under the idea of habits (for this would be as if some things were distinct from other things under the idea of ‘animal’ and not distinct from them under the idea of ‘man’). Besides, it supposes too that the principles distinguish the habits in some other genus of cause than as efficient principles, which is false, because if the principles possess some idea of cause that makes distinctions in respect of habits they possess only the idea of efficient cause. Besides, the reason is still in place that, however much one can posit distinct cognitive habits, yet one does not preserve the need for one of them, as though the knowledge would otherwise be impossible, when one posits the possibility of a second habit that is for any reason distinct.

82. Therefore to the argument I reply that in those speculative sciences, although all objects of speculation are treated of, yet not as to everything that is knowable about them, because not as to their properties, in the way it was made clear in the third reason [nn.40-47] against the first opinion.

83. To the fourth [n.9] the response is thus, that the first principles cannot be applied to any conclusions save those of sense; both because their terms are abstracted from sensibles and thus reflect the nature of them, and because the agent intellect, by which the application must be made, is limited to sensibles.

84. On the contrary: it is certain to the intellect that those first principles are true not only in sensibles but also in non-sensibles; for the intellect has no more doubt in the case of immaterial things than in the case of material ones that contradictories are not both true. And as to the remark that the term of the first principle is being as divided into the ten categories, and that this does not extend itself to the object of theology, it is of no force; for we are not more in doubt about God that contradictories are not both true (as that God is blessed and not blessed and the like) than about something white.

85. Another response is given, that conclusions do not follow from major premises alone but with the minor premises added; but the minors that should be added to them are not now naturally manifest.

On the contrary: the minors to be assumed under the first principles make assertions about things assumed ‘under’ the terms that are the subjects of the first principles; but it is known that the terms of the first principles are said of anything whatever, because they are most common;     therefore etc     .

86. For this reason I respond that the second part of the minor is false, namely this, that in the first principles ‘all knowable conclusions are virtually included’ [n.10]. In proof I say that just as the subject terms are common, so also are the predicate terms. When, therefore, the subject terms, because they are distributed, are taken to cover everything, they are not taken to cover everything except in respect of the predicate terms that are most common, and consequently, by virtue of such principles, only the most common predicates are known about lower things.

87. This is clear in the reason, because the middle term cannot be the ‘why’ in respect of any property save of one that is virtually included in the idea of the middle term; but in the idea of the subject of the most common principle the ‘why’ of any particular property is not included, but only of the most common property; therefore the subject cannot be the middle term or reason for knowing anything save under the most common idea. But there are in addition to the most common properties many other knowable properties for which the properties of the first principles cannot be the middle terms, because they do not include them. Therefore there are many knowable truths that are not included in the first principles.

This is clear in the example, because the statement ‘every whole is greater than its part’, although it includes the statement ‘four is greater than two’, and other like statements about the same predicate, yet it does not include the following: ‘four is double in respect of two’, ‘three is in the relation of one and a half to two’, for there would be need that these predicates have special middle terms which include them.

88. The third proof [the first proof is n.86, the second n.87], a logical one, is that although it may be possible to descend under the subject of a universal affirmative, yet not under the predicate; but many predicates contained under the predicates of the first principles are knowable of things inferior to the subjects of the principles;     therefore these predicates are not known of these subjects through the first principles.

89. An objection against this: ‘affirmation or negation about a thing are also both about the same not-thing’; the consequence follows, ‘therefore about this white or nonwhite’, in such a way that it is licit to descend there under the predicate and under the subject.

I reply that the principle ‘affirmation or negative about a thing’ etc     . is equivalent to the principle ‘one side of any contradiction about anything is true and the other false’, where there are two distributed terms and it is licit to descend under either distributed term to ‘    therefore about this part of this contradiction’ etc     .; but under a predicate that only stands confusedly it is not licit to descend, because this does not follow, ‘one side of any contradiction about anything,     therefore this side’. Thus it is in other principles; the predicate of a universal affirmative always only stands confusedly, whether there are two distributed terms there in the subject or one.

And in the proposed example the proposed case is also plain. Just because it is knowable about man that he is capable of laughter, never can more be inferred by the principle ‘one side of any contradiction’ etc     . than that ‘therefore about man he is either capable or not capable of laughter’. One or other part, then, of the predicated disjunction will never be known of the subject by this principle, but some other special principle is required, as the definition of the subject or the property, which is indeed the middle term and the reason for knowing ‘capable of laughter’ determinately of man.

V. To the Principal Arguments

90. To the principal arguments. - To the first [n.1] I draw a distinction about the natural object. For ‘natural object’ can be taken either for that which can naturally or by the action of causes naturally active be attained, or for that to which the power is naturally inclined, whether it can naturally attain the object or not. The major, then, might be denied by denying ‘natural’ in the first way, because the first object is something adequate to the power and is therefore abstracted from all those things that the power is able to operate on; however it is not necessary that the intellect, if it could naturally understand some such common thing, could naturally understand whatever is contained under it, because the understanding of something contained is much more excellent than a confused understanding of such a common thing; thus, although the minor is in each sense conceded, the intended conclusion is not gained, namely the conclusion about something naturally attainable, because the major in this way was false.

91. Against this response I reply that it destroys itself. For the first object is by itself something adequate to the power and is true, namely because the power has regard to nothing as object except what has in it the nature of the first object, and whatever has in it the nature of the first object the power has regard to it as to its object; therefore it is impossible for something to be naturally first without anything whatever that is contained in it being thus per se naturally the object. For grant the opposite, and then it is not naturally adequate but exceeds, and something inferior to it is adequate, and thus is first.

Now the reason that is adduced for the response [n.90] is the fallacy of figure of speech. For although being, insofar as it is something intelligible in one act (as man is intelligible in one understanding), is naturally intelligible (for the one understanding of being as of a single object is natural), yet being cannot be posited as the first object naturally attainable, because it is the first object as it is included in all per se objects, and as such only whatever among them is naturally intelligible is naturally attainable. Therefore the phrase ‘this thing’ is altered to ‘this thing as qualified’ when it is argued ‘being is naturally intelligible, therefore being as it is the first object of the intellect is the adequate object and naturally attainable,’ for the antecedent is true of being as it is one intelligible, the way white is, but the consequent draws a conclusion about being as it is included in all intelligibles, not as it is intelligible apart from them.

92. To the argument [n.1], then, there is another response, a real one, namely because the minor is false about the natural object, that it is naturally attainable, - it is true in the other way, namely as that to which the power is naturally inclined or ordained [n.90]. And in this way should the authority of Avicenna be understood. But as to what should be set down as the first object naturally attainable, 1 d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.8-12 below is about it. The response is confirmed by Anselm On Free Choice of the Will ch.3, ‘We have, as I think, no ability,’ he says, ‘that is sufficient of itself for act.’ He calls ability what we commonly call power; it is clear from his example about sight. It is not therefore inappropriate for a power to be naturally ordained to an object which it cannot naturally attain by natural causes, after the manner of anything that is directed of itself alone to something and yet cannot on its own attain that something.

93. To the second argument [n.2] I deny the consequence. - To the proof [n.2] the thing is clear from what was said [nn.73-78] in the response given to the second argument for the opinion of the Philosopher, that higher things are ordered to the passive reception of a higher perfection than they themselves can actively produce, and consequently their perfection cannot be produced except by some supernatural agent. It is not so with the perfection of inferior things, whose final perfection can be subject to the action of inferior agents.

94. To the third argument [n.3] I say that the possible intellect is not commensurate with firm possession of every propositional truth, that is, it is not commensurate with being moved by the sort of agents that it cannot get to know from phantasms and the natural light of the agent intellect.

When you argue ‘therefore it is made commensurate by something else’ I concede the point - both as to ‘by something else’ in the sense of ‘by a mover’, because the possible intellect assents to the truth through a mover that reveals supernaturally, and as to ‘by something else’ in the sense of ‘by a form’, because it assents by the assent that is made in the possible intellect, which assent is a sort of inclination in the intellect toward that object, making it commensurate with the object.

When about that ‘something else’ you ask further ‘whether it is natural or supernatural’, I say that it is supernatural, whether you understand the question of the agent or of the form.

When you infer ‘therefore the intellect is not commensurate with it, and is by something else made commensurate with it ’, I say that it is of itself in a state of obediential potency with respect to the agent [cf. 3 d.1 q.2 n.7, q.4 n.2], and thus it is sufficiently commensurate with it for the purpose of being moved by it. Likewise, it is of itself capable of the assent caused by such an agent, even naturally capable; it is not necessary, therefore, that it be by something else made commensurate for receiving the very assent.

A stand, then, is made at the second stage, not the first [n.3], because the revealed truth does not sufficiently incline the intellect to assent to it, and thus the agent is not commensurate and the recipient is not commensurate to it; but a supernatural agent does sufficiently incline the intellect to the truth, by causing in it an assent whereby it is commensurate with this truth, such that there is no need for the intellect to be by something else made commensurate to such an agent or to the form it impresses, as there is need that it be by something else made commensurate in the two aforesaid ways to such an object [n.94].